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Abstract—Though recent advancements in DC micro-
grids are largely based on distributed control strategies to
enhance reliability and scalability, the absence of a central-
ized controller to check the global information makes these
schemes highly susceptible to cyber attacks. Since false
data injection attacks (FDIAs) are considered as a promi-
nent attack methodology in DC microgrids, prior emphasis
is usually laid on compromised sensors and controllers
only related to DC voltages. Hence, this paper firstly segre-
gates the FDIAs on the output currents into destablization
and deception attacks, based on the modeling of attack
elements with respect to the consensus theory. Secondly, a
discordant element based detection approach is designed
to detect the attacked nodes accurately, using an extended
analysis of the cooperative control network. A risk assess-
ment framework for DC microgrids against cyber attacks
is provided alongside all the case studies. An evaluation
theory is also presented to assist the proposed detection
scheme to differentiate between cyber attacks and faults.
Further, the proposed detection approach is theoretically
verified and validated using simulation and experimental
conditions.
Index Terms—DC microgrid, cyber attacks, distributed
control, cyber-physical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rapid development of DC microgrids can be ascribedto their high flexibility in integrating renewable energy
sources, storage devices and modern electronic loads, in both
grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation [1]. Com-
pared to a centralized framework that is vulnerable to a single
point-of-failure, a distributed control structure is considered as
a scalable and efficient control architecture to manage a net-
work [2]. Moreover, distributed communication ensures robust
performance under cyber imperfections such as communica-
tion delays, link failures and data packet losses [3]. The main
philosophy behind distributed control in DC microgrids is to
achieve average voltage regulation [4] and proportionate load
current sharing [5] between the participating agents. These
operations are conventionally carried out with the assumption
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of a reliable cyber network reporting true measurements [6].
However, any physical violation or erroneous measurement in
the microgrid degrade the system operation or lead to unstable
performance [7]. Such events can occur in the presence of
cyber attacks, which can be introduced by illegitimate data
intrusion into the cyber-physical components such as sensors
and communication links.
Cyber attacks are a growing concern for modern power
systems, which therefore strives for security enhancements.
Such attacks can take place using various intrusion techniques,
which can be divided into several categories such as false
data injection attacks (FDIAs) [8], denial of service (DoS)
[9] and replay attacks [10]. They are all capable of disrupting
the network stability and control structures. This paper focuses
on investigation of FDIAs, as the most prominent cyber attack
example. To alleviate the burden of singularity in centralized
systems, distributed control can be an alternative approach
for improved security. However, distributed schemes are more
vulnerable to cyber attacks due to the propagation of attack
element into the neighbors. Such attacks can take place in
micorgrids remotely, using compromised data, communication
protocols and cyber channels.
Cyber attacks can also be coordinated, where the attacker
attains sufficient knowledge about the system involving control
and network architecture to create attack vectors, which can
easily bypass the well-defined bad-data detection tests [11].
Such data intrusion method can be categorized as generalized
FDIA, which is also commonly termed as a stealth attack [12].
In the context of DC microgrids, a stealth attack ensures a
zero neighborhood tracking error for each agent as discussed
in [13]. The attacker can use this discreet behavior to attack
microgrids by penetrating into the control system deceitfully,
and cause instability later in unforeseeable ways. Since the
control objectives in DC microgrids can be maneuvered arti-
ficially to cause instability, the risk assessment against such
attacks requires significant attention.
Considerable research to quantify the impact on DC micro-
grid using FDIAs and DoS attacks is done using candidate
invariants in [14] and hyperproperties in [15]. Referring to
[16], active defense watermarking techniques, which are used
to detect such intrusions using a set of feedback signals, can
generate unlikely output under attacks. However, the design
of the abovementioned approaches are quite complex as it re-
quires accurate model checking tools. It gives rise to increased
computational burden and complications. Moreover, artificial
intelligence based data driven tools can exploit the unbiased
state variables of any plant to determine the attacked node.
Nevertheless, the conundrum behind the presence of attack
elements in any dataset will always remain a concern. For such
simplistic models, Sahoo et. al. in [13] have proposed a stealth
attack detection strategy for false data intrusion into voltage
sensors. Intuitively, the basic philosophy behind power flow
control in DC microgrids is by controlling the voltages, which
draws primary attention to the associated voltage counterparts
only for cyber attacks.
Considering these issues, this paper firstly studies two
variants of false data injection into current sensor(s), namely
destabilization and deception attacks. Secondly, a fully dis-
tributed discord element based detection strategy is proposed
to identify the attacked agent, by extending basic principles
of consensus theory. As a result, the effective cost and
resources required to implement this scheme on an already
established prototype is minimal. A theoretical framework
for both variants of attacks is provided using the converter
equations to validate the detection theory. Risk assessment of
the attacks and their impact on microgrids have been analyzed
to understand the critical liabilities at risk. Differentiation
between faults and cyber attacks is also carried out using an
evaluation theory, which assists the proposed detection scheme
to avoid false tripping of relays. To test the robustness of
the proposed detection scheme, it has been evaluated under
multiple scenarios including communication delay, plug in-
and-out of converter(s) using attack models of varying severity.
The performance has been validated under simulation and
experimental conditions to conclude that the proposed detec-
tion scheme can reliably detect the presence of attacks and
sunbsequently activate the appropriate defense mechanisms.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, the proposed detection
strategy has never been proposed in detecting FDI attacks in
DC microgrids.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
depicts a brief overview of the cyber-physical architecture
of DC microgrids alongwith a basic overhaul of distributed
secondary control objectives and equations. A comprehensive
risk assessment framework alongwith definition and charac-
terization of FDI attacks is provided in Section III. Section
IV depicts the proposed detection scheme with theoretical
analysis. Simulations along with experimental validation are
presented in Section V and VI, respectively. Finally, Section
VII provides the concluding remarks and future scope of this
work.
II. CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTED CONTROL STRATEGY
IN DC MICROGRIDS
An exemplary autonomous DC microgrid considered in this
work is shown in Fig. 1. N DC sources connected via DC/DC
converters of equal power rating are interconnected to each
other via tie-lines forming the physical layer of the microgrid.
DC/DC converters are operated in voltage controlled mode.
Droop control philosophy ensures equal current sharing by
imposing voltage offset error. To compensate for this offset,
secondary controllers are deployed [17]. In the cyber layer,
an undirected graph is considered, where vertices denote the
points of connections of physical sources (DC/DC converters).
Fig. 1. Generic cyber-physical model of DC microgrid with N agents:
Blue arrows represent the cyber layer and black lines represent the
physical circuit. Red and brown lines represent deception and destabi-
lization attacks, respectively. The local and neighboring measurements
are indicated by green and violet lines, respectively.
Each vertex sends and receives ψj = {V̄dcj , I
pu
dcj
} from its
neighboring vertices to achieve average voltage regulation and
proportionate current sharing, where V̄dcj and I
pu
dcj
denote the
average voltage estimate and per unit output current of the
neighboring agents. Each agent is represented via a node and
a communication digraph via edges using an adjacency matrix
A = [aij ] ε RN×N . The communication weights are given by:
aij =
{
> 0, if (xi, xj) ε E
0, else
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, with xi and xj
being the local and neighboring node respectively. Using the
cyber graph, the local input can be written as:
ui =
∑
i∈Mi
aij(ψj − ψi) (1)
where ui = {uVi , u
I
i } corresponding to the elements in ψ
and Mi denote the set of neighbors of ith agent. Mathemat-
ically, the incoming information matrix can be denoted by
Zin =
∑
i ε N aij . Hence, if both matrices match each other,
the Laplacian matrix L is balanced, where L = Zin − A and
its elements are given by:
lij =

deg(ni) , i = j
−1 , i 6= j
0 , otherwise
(2)
where deg(ni) is the degree of ith agent.
Remark I: As per the synchronization law [19], all the agents
participating in distributed control will achieve consensus
using ẋ = −Lx for a well-spanned matrix L such that
lim
t→∞
xi(t) = c, ∀i ε N , where c is the steady-state reference
and N is the number of agents.
To establish these objectives for DC/DC converters operat-
ing to maintain output voltage, two voltage correction terms
for ith agent are calculated using:
∆V1i = H1(s) (Vdcref − uVi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
eVi
(3)
∆V2i = H2(s) (Idcref − uIi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
eIi
(4)
where H1(s)(= KH1P +
K
H1
I
s ), H2(s)(= K
H2
P +
K
H2
I
s ) are
PI controllers and Vdcref and Idcref are the global reference
voltage and current quantities for all the agents, respectively.
It should be noted that Idcref = 0 for proportionate current
sharing between the agents. The correction terms obtained in
(3)-(4) are finally added to the global reference voltage Vdcref
setpoint to achieve local voltage references for ith agent using:
V idcref = Vdcref + ∆V1i + ∆V2i . (5)
Using (5) as the local voltage reference for ith agent, the
secondary objectives highlighted in Fig. 1 is achieved.
III. DEFINITION AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF FDI
ATTACKS IN DC MICROGRIDS
The intent of cyber attacks could be either aimed at im-
mediate destabilization of the microgrid or to deceive the
system operator by penetrating the control system in a discreet
manner. This discretion can be tactfully used by the attacker
for detailed analysis of the network behavior, parameters and
then utilize the available data to plan and execute a coordinated
FDI attack, which can cause immediate shutdown of the
microgrid.
Fig. 2. Case study–A symmetric attack element causes deception at
t=1 s adhering to (6), however an asymmetric attack element at t=2 s
destabilizes the operation.
Using the distributed consensus algorithm for a well con-
nected cyber graph in a DC microgrid, the system objectives
for DC microgrids using (1)-(5) shall converge to:
lim
t→∞
φi(t) = Vdcref , limt→∞
uIi (t) = 0 ∀i ε N (6)
where φi(t) = Vdci(t) +
∫
j ε Ni
uVi (t) with Vdci denoting the
output voltage of ith agent. However, under attacks, the system
resorts into a different operating condition, given by:
lim
t→∞
φi(t) = V
a
dcref
, lim
t→∞
uIi (t) 6= 0 ∀i ε N (7)
where V adcref 6= Vdcref .
Definition 1: Any FDI attack which results in the control
inputs converging as per (7) during the operation of DC
microgrids can be defined as destabilization attack.
In particular, network stability is compromised if certain
voltage bounds in the buses are exceeded, because over- and
under-voltage relays may trip. The attack can be formulated
in such a manner that the voltages of each agent go outside
the allowable operational limit.
Assuming a pre-condition that the system always operates
at a certain global reference voltage, which is known to each
agent, (7) should be a sufficient criteria to justify that the
system is attacked by an external entity. However, some attacks
can be conducted with more sophistication such that the attack
occurs, yet the system satisfies (6).
Definition 2: Any FDI attack which results in the control
inputs converging as per (6) during the operation of DC
microgrids can be defined as deception attack.
Basically, such attacks allow the attacker to penetrate into
the control system without affecting control objectives. Such
sophisticated attacks can have adverse effect in the long run
as the attacker has access to multiple nodes and can create
unintentional generation outage, which may eventually lead
to loss of functionality. Under these circumstances, detection
of the attacked agent(s) under both the classes of attacks in
a distributed network is an important aspect to prevent the
system from further instability.
Since stealth attacks on voltage sensors, which creates
misbehavior with the voltage observer in DC microgrids, has
already been studied in [13], this paper focuses on detection
of destabilization and deception attacks on current sensors.
Using this information, the attack in ith agent can be modeled
as follows:
Sensor attack: xfi = xi + κx
a
i (8)
Cyber link attack: xfij = xij + κx
a
i (9)
where κ = 1 denotes the presence of an attack element
xai in the measurement xi in i
th agent, or 0 otherwise. It
is worth notifying that the sensor and cyber link attacks
can be conducted separately by hijacking the controller and
communication server, respectively [13].
A case study is done in Fig. 2 on a DC microgrid with N=4
agents to show the impact of deception and destabilization
attacks on current sensors. When an attack element of Iadc =
{0, 0, 5, 0} A is introduced into the sensor and communication
link at t = 1 s, the output currents increase equally as if there
is a change in load. Moreover, the average voltage is regulated
back to Vdcref = 315 V. As per Definition 2, all the necessary
conditions are met, which certifies it as a deception attack.
However at t = 2 s, another attack element is introduced
only into the sensors with Iadc = {0, 0, 20, 0} A. It can
be seen that the output currents increase invariably with the
voltages ramping up. As the voltages reach close to over-
voltage threshold (highlighted in Fig. 2), it could potentially
lead to the shutdown of the system. It is worth notifying
that the case study in Fig. 2 is done without considering
any relays or protection devices to provide a clear picture of
the consequences caused by destabilization attacks. Hence the
attacker deceitfully infiltrates into the control system of agent
III at t = 1 s and causes a destabilization attack later, as per
Definition 1.
Remark II: From the case study in Fig. 2, it can be determined
that the attack element has to be symmetric in case of a decep-
tion attack, such that the false data is injected locally(sensors)
and the neighbors(transmitted via communication) to satisfy:
İ
a
dc = LI
a
dc. (10)
If the above condition is not true, it will lead to a destabiliza-
tion attack.
To extend the analysis of the modeled attacks in Remark
II, a set of eigenvalues to represent the system and attack
dynamics, ΞS and ΞA respectively, can be defined as:
ΞS = {λ1S , λ2S , ..., λNS } (11)
ΞA = {λ1A, λ2A, ..., λNA } (12)
where λ denote the respective eigenvalues. A detailed state-
space modeling of cooperative DC microgrids can be referred
from [18].
Remark III: Considering the attack models in (8)-(9) with Iadc
defined in (10), injecting an attack signal into any node,
1) destabilizes the system, if ΞS ∩ΞA 6= 0, uIi 6= 0. These
attack models are categorized as destabilization attacks.
2) leads to a feasible and stable solution, if ΞS ∩ ΞA =
0, uIi = 0. These attack models are categorized as
deception attacks.
As outlined in the abovementioned case study, unexpected
risks can be introduced in cooperative DC microgrids us-
ing both variants of FDI attacks. Hence, a risk assessment
framework is provided for DC microgrids to quantify the risk
imposed to critical infrastructures. The risk assessment (RA)
index can be given by:
RA = IA x MO (13)
where IA denotes the intrusion access index, which indicates
the number of compromised sensors in an agent and MO de-
notes the microgrid outage index, which suggests the physical
outcome to the microgrid infrastructure due to the FDI attack.
The conditional visualization of the abovementioned indices
is provided in Table I.
TABLE I
CONDITIONAL VISUALIZATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT FOR FDI
ATTACKS IN DC MICROGRIDS
Intrusion Access Index Microgrid Outage Index
Single Sensor or Cyber Link 1 Line Outage 1
Single Sensor & Cyber Link 2 Converter Outage 2
Multiple Sensors & Cyber Links 3 Shutdown 3
Using (13), it can be deduced that the risk concerns are
at the lowest in DC microgrids for RA = 1 and increases
until 9. Moreover, since this study is based on determining
the maximum casualty prior to any FDI attack, the maximum
value of MO index shall always be considered in the case of
cascaded events. For the case study in Fig. 2, the RA index
will amount to 4 (i.e, 2x2) since the converter in agent III has
to be plugged out to restore the operation. Converter outage
increase the loading on the remaining converters, which may
run into overloading during highly loaded conditions. It is
worth noting that the indices have been ranked considering
the loss of functionality prior to each event. Based on different
attack models, it is intuitive that the access indices have pre-
defined boundaries of causing cyber-physical outcomes in DC
microgrids. For example, a single sensor attack (IA = 1) in any
agent may dismantle the control loop as per Remark II, leading
to an overvoltage condition. As a result, the overvoltage relays
cause plugging out of the converter to ensure stability of the
rest of the system. Moreover, this situation may turn fatal if
the abovementioned attack is carried out in a bus with high
loading, which exceeds the overcurrent continuous flow limits
of a line, causing line outage. Consequently, the MO index for
the abovementioned scenario is limited between 1 to 2. Finally,
the MO outcomes can be quantified with factors such as the
magnitude of attack vectors, symmetricity of attack elements’
distribution in the microgrid and the cyber topology. A similar
analogy can be followed for the rest of the IA indices.
Hence, the consequences of an attack can be identified
in conjunction with the proposed risk assessment index to
identify the most important risks to be managed. Moreover, it
should be noted that the line and converter outages are caused
by relays, which are set to operate on certain overvoltage
and overcurrent threshold values. Using this framework, the
severity of both variants of FDI attacks can be quantified to
formalize the detection and defense measures accordingly.
IV. PROPOSED DISCORDANT ELEMENT BASED
DETECTION STRATEGY
This section involves discussion of the proposed discordant
element (DE) based detection approach for both categories
of FDI attacks in a cooperative DC microgrids. The basic
challenge lies in determining the attacked agent in cooperative
network, which becomes more appealing as the transmitted
false data in any given agent also propagates to its neighbors.
1) Destabilization Attacks: Considering a constant signal
attack on current sensor in ith agent using Remark II & III,
it can be written as
LIadc 6= 0 (14)
Under such case, the output currents from all the agents
will not be shared equally. Consequently, the solution to
cooperative synchronization error for output currents using
Remark I under such attacks can be written as:
eI(t) = e−hvLteI(0) +
∫ t
0
e−hvL(t−τ)kdτ (15)
where k = ηLeI
a
, where η is a diagonal matrix which
indicates the presence of attack in the current sensor using
a non-zero value. For positive-definite values of L and hV ,
the first term in (15) goes to zero. Using eAt =
∑∞
i=1(At)
i,
the final steady state value of (15) is given by
eI(t)→
∞∑
i=1
∫ t
0
(−hV (L(t− τ))idτ (16)
Hence, for non-zero elements in the Laplacian graph, lij 6=
0, the synchronization error in (16) converges to a non-zero
value. As a result, the synchronization error leads to a ramped
up/down quantity for ∆V2i corresponding to the output of PI
controller in (3). Using this condition as a sufficient criteria, it
can be alternatively termed as output currents from each bus
are in discord with each other for a non-zero synchronization
error. Hence, the operational dynamics of secondary sublayer
I will not obey consensus theory as per [13].
2) Deception Attacks: However in case of deception at-
tacks, the cooperative synchronization law holds true as per
Remark II & III for symmetric attack vector in current sensors
and communication links. Hence, φ obeying Remark I, can be
written in vector form as:
˙̄Vdc + LV̄dc = V̇dc = 0 (17)
Moreover, the voltage dynamics at each bus in vector form
can be written as:
V̇dc = C−1(DkIin − Ifdc) (18)
where Dk = 1− D. Further, Iin, D, C and Ifdc denote the
diagonal matrices of the input current Iini , duty ratio Di,
DC link capacitance Ci and the attacked output current mea-
surement Idci respectively for N agents. Since the average
voltage estimates aren’t compromised, they adhere to the
global reference.
Fig. 3. Proposed discordant element based detection controller using
local and neighboring measurements for ith agent in DC microgrids–
DEI to detect anomalies in the current counterparts.
Considering the error dynamics into the voltage controller
under steady-state conditions, we get:
LT∆V1 + LTH2eIa + Vdcref = L
TVdc (19)
where eIa denotes a diagonal matrix of the error quantity in
(1) with attacked current signals.
Remark IV: Since the system objectives in (6) are met for a
deception attack, LT∆V1 = 0 holds true [13].
Using Remark IV and differentiating (19), we get:
LTKH2P ė
Ia + LTKH2I e
Ia − LT V̇dc = 0. (20)
In steady state, eIa = 0. Further using Remark III,
LTC−1Iadc = 0. Using these equalities after substituting (17)
in (18), we get:
LTKH2P ė
Ia − LTC−1DkIin = 0. (21)
Remark V: Due to the injected attack signal, the first term of
(21) will be asymmetric, as explained in (16). For (21) to hold
true, this property will be reflected in the second term of (21),
which becomes the basis of detection for false data injection
attacks in cooperative DC microgrids.
Using Remark V, it is intuitional that LT Iin will always
converge to zero under no attacks for normalized duty ratios
Di across the microgrid. Hence, it has been proved that
the normalized input current reference quantities also achieve
consensus among themselves for a constant global reference
voltage at the output of their respective DC/DC converters in
DC microgrids.
Fig. 4. Performance evaluation of discordant theory in the input current
references when subjected to deception attack on Agent III in DC
microgrids- I3inref does not obey cooperative synchronization under the
attack.
As shown in Fig. 3, the input current Iiin is controlled
using a reference current value obtained from the outer voltage
controlled loop. Hence for an attack in secondary sublayer
II output prior to a deception attack, it causes the outer
voltage loop to operate differently for each agent. Since a
load change in ith agent introduces a voltage transient dip,
this forms a positive voltage error for the non-attacked agents.
However for the attacked agent, this error will be negative
since the secondary sublayer II output maloperates as a result
of the compromised current information. It has been clearly
shown in Fig. 4 that the compromised agent’s current reference
goes discordant with the remaining agents to authorize the
discordant element based detection theory.
Definition 3: A state variable that does not obey consensus
theory in the presence of cyber attack is said to be in a
discordant state.
To account for this discord effect, a discordant element for
current counterparts, DEiI is proposed using the local and
neighboring measurements to detect likely attacks on the
output current sensors and cyber links of ith agent using:
DEiI = li[
∑
jεMi
Ijinref − I
i
inref
][
∑
jεMi
Ijinref + I
i
inref
] (22)
where Iiinref is the reference input current obtained from
the outer voltage control loop in ith agent. Moreover, li is
a positive quantity, which is used to increase/decrease the
value of DEiI . Hence by a similar definition for DE
i
I , any
positive value in (22) will reflect an attack in the current
counterparts of ith agent. Another fortcoming point is that any
data intrusion in the input current sensors would not affect the
system response under any circumstances. This resiliency can
be attributed to the fact that it is a part of the nested control
loop for DC/DC converter shown in Fig. 3. Concluding the
above remarks, any likely attack on the current counterparts
of ith agent in DC microgrid can be determined by monitoring
positive values for DEiI , which can be alternatively written as:
DEiI =
{
0, if κ = 0
> 0, else
(23)
Hence, (23) provides an unified and fully distributed discor-
dant element based attack detection scheme in DC microgrids
for the abovementioned variants of FDI attacks.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed detection theory is tested on cyber-physical
DC microgrids with N= 4 agents, as shown in Fig. 1. Each
agent of equal power capacities comprising of a DC source and
DC/DC boost converter, operate to maintain output voltage for
a global reference Vdcref = 315 V at their respective buses.
The robustness of the proposed DE based detection theory
has been tested for deception attacks on single and multiple
agents in DC microgrids (IA = [2, 3]), which goes undetected
by distributed voltage observer. Furthermore, it is also tested
for destabilization attacks (IA = 1) on accurate identification
of the attacked counterparts in any agent. It should be noted
that each event in the abovementioned detection scenarios are
separated by a certain time-gap to provide clear understanding.
Moreover, the attack vector Iadc consist of attack elements for
each agent in the order of {Iadc1 ,I
a
dc2
..., IadcN }. The simulation
plant and control parameters are provided in Appendix.
In the first case study in Fig. 5, a destabilization attack is
injected using the attack elements Iadc = {0, 2.4, 0, 3.2} A
into the current sensors respectively in multiple agents in DC
microgrids, i.e, agent II and IV at t = 2 s. Since the sensors
are attacked, it falls under the category IA = 1. As soon
as the attack is initiated, the current sharing among agents
grow disproportionate, which leads to a non-zero error into
the secondary sublayer II. As a result, ∆V2i of each agent
starts ramping, thereby dissembling the final references in each
agent, which impairs the global voltage regulation as shown
in Fig. 5. Under such scenarios, the microgrid may run into
a state MO > 2, leading to loss of functionality. Hence, the
RA index using such attacks is limited to 2 as per (13). As
per the proposed detection theory in (23), both {DE2I , DE
4
I }
indicate a positive value, as shown in Fig. 5, for the attacked
agents II and IV. Upon detection, the attack is removed from
the affected agents at t = 3 s, which brings back the system
into following the control objectives in (6).
Next, a deception attack is injected in Fig. 6 using the
attack elements Iadc = {0, 1.6, 1.8, 0} A into the current
sensors and cyber link respectively into agents II and III at
t = 1 s. As per Table I, it can be categorized under IA
= 2. When the attack is initiated, it can be seen in Fig. 6
that the voltages at each bus are still distributed around the
global reference of Vdcref = 315 V. Moreover, as a result
of the false data injection into the current sensors and cyber
link, a visual imprint of load change is created without any
actual physical disturbance. This behavior deceives the system
operator, thereby adhering to the control objectives, otherwise.
Such attacks can be critical as this action can be deceitfully
used by the attacker to cause destabilization in DC microgrids
later. Identifying such conditions as a severe risk to infiltrate
large attack vectors later, it can cause critical damage to the
system by shutting down both converters (MO > 2). Hence,
the RA index lies in the range of [4, 6]. As per the proposed
attack detection theory for deception attacks, DE2I and DE
3
I
goes positive at t = 2 s to indicate the presence of false
data elements for the current counterparts in agent II and III.
When the attack is removed, the proportionate current sharing
and voltage regulation inputs operate normally with unbiased
measurements. More details on mitigating techniques for such
attacks can be referred from [15].
To demonstrate the resiliency of attacks for false data injec-
tion into the input current sensor, another attack (highlighted
as Attack II) is introduced at t = 3 s in Fig. 6, which does not
create further exploitation in the system since the reference
signal for input current Iinref is generated as a nested loop
control output. It can not be exploited by data intrusion in a
closed loop voltage regulated control system.
To differentiate between faults and cyber attacks, a case
study is presented in Fig. 7 for a short time-scale (≈ 100
ms) illustrating the response of a DC/DC converter in case
of FDI attacks and faults. It should be noted that the origin
in Fig. 7(b) is (Vdcref , Idc), where Idc will vary between the
minimum and maximum current limit based on the loading
level. A boundary of operation region is defined in Fig. 7(a),
which varies within {X ∈ [Vin, 1.3Vdcref ], Y ∈ [Imin, Imax]}.
It can be observed that positive and negative destabilization
attacks cause the trajectories to move into Quadrant I and
III respectively. Further, deception attacks with a feasible
solution operate either in Quadrant II/IV corresponding to
an increase in load in the same/different bus. This behavior
can be attributed to the response of the distributed secondary
controller in (3)-(5). However, in case of DC line-to-line faults,
the response of the primary control layer results in a large
increase in the output current alongwith a decrease in output
voltage. This behavior can be clearly seen in Fig. 7(a) where
the fault trajectory goes out of the boundary of operation
in less than 100 ms. Since the timescale separation between
the secondary and primary layers is considerably large, this
evaluation theory (within a certain time frame ≈ 100 ms) can
be used locally as a substantial indicator to assist the proposed
detection scheme in differentiating between faults and cyber
attacks.
Next, the response of output currents following the consid-
ered attacks is discussed. Referring to Fig. 6, it can be seen that
the output currents rise to a new value when a constant valued
deception attack is initiated at t = 1 s. Using Remark IV, it has
Fig. 5. Performance of the proposed detection strategy under destabilization attack on current sensors in agent II and IV– DEI for agents II and IV
indicate positive values beyond their bounds suggesting that the current sensors of agent II and IV are injected with false data.
Fig. 6. Performance of the proposed detection strategy under deception attack on current sensors and cyber links in agent II and III– DEI for
agents II and III becomes positive as soon as the attack is initiated. Attack II carried out in the input current sensor of agent II can not be further
exploited as Iinref is a control output in the closed loop voltage regulation.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) Response of DC/DC converter in a distributed control based
DC microgrid to attacks and faults for 100 ms– Quadrant II shows the
faulted area outside the boundary of operation, (b) Zoomed picture of
the boundary of operation.
been proved in [13] that ∆V1 = 0 when the generation-demand
balance is maintained. With this hypothesis, when the attack is
initiated, it can be seen in Fig. 6 that it causes a rise in ∆V2 for
(N -1) agents (excluding the attacked agent) in the secondary
sublayer in (4). Consequently, the voltage reference for each
agent in (5) evolve to obey Remark IV. Since the loads in Fig.
6 are voltage-dependent, the active power demand increases.
There is also a rise in the difference of the output voltage
as each agent compensates for tie-line losses. As a result, the
output currents rise to a feasible solution following a deception
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Performance of the proposed detection strategy using two
different attack models: (a) A deception attack (IA = 2) modeled as
Iadc3 = (1 + 0.8sin 0.4πt) A on agent III at t = 1 s, (b) Deception attack
(IA = 3) modeled as {Iadc1 , I
a
dc3
} = 1.5t A on agent I and III at t = 1 s.
attack to compensate for the increased demand and line losses.
This behavior is a critical issue in autonomous DC systems
with batteries as the prime sources.
To test the robustness of the proposed detection strategy, a
deception attack Iadc3 = (1 + 0.8sin 0.4πt) A is injected into
agent III at t = 1 s in Fig. 8(a). It can be seen that the sinusoidal
trace is in the positive DEI region for agent III. Further, two
deception attacks {Iadc1 , I
a
dc3
} = 1.5t A are injected into agents
I and III simultaneously at t = 1 s in Fig. 8(b). As per the
proposed detection criteria, ramp traces are observed for both
DE1I and DE
3
I . This establishes robustness of the proposed
scheme in detecting false data attacks in the realm of DC
microgrids.
The performance of the proposed scheme to detect cyber
Fig. 9. Performance of the proposed detection strategy under deception attack (IA = 2) in agent IV– Positive DEI for agent IV indicates the
presence of attack even when agent I is plugged in and out at t = 2 and 3.5 respectively.
Fig. 10. Performance of the proposed detection strategy under decep-
tion attack initiated in a sequence on current sensors & cyber links in
all the agents after a gap of 0.5 s starting from t=1 s– During t= 2.5-3.5
s, only DE1I and DE
3
I are in the detection zone, thereby suggesting
the critical boundary of the proposed detection strategy under highest
access index level (IA = 3).
Fig. 11. Performance of the proposed detection strategy for a maximum
communication delay of 120 ms under deception attack (IA = 2) in agent
III– Positive DEI for agent III indicates the presence of attack.
attacks is tested when agent I is plugged in and out at t
= 2 and 3.5 s respectively in Fig. 9. In realistic scenarios,
these cases may arise when input sources such as batteries
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Fig. 12. Experimental setup comprising of four commercial DC/DC
converters connected in parallel in a ring circuit. They are controlled
via four separate control units to maintain output voltage using a ring-
based distributed cyber network between them to supply power to the
programmable DC load.
run out of charging capacity. This mandates plugging out of
the respective age t from the system. In Fig. 9, it can be
observed that DE4I becomes positive as soon as the attack
Iadc4 = 1.2 A is initiated in agent IV. It is worth notifying that
the communication links and control is lost for the plugged
out agent. Under this condition, DEI in (22) will only be
calculated for the active agents. As a result, DEI in (22) does
not account for any measurements from agent I while it is
plugged out. However, when agent I is restored back into the
system with control and communication link enabled, it can
be seen that the proposed discordant element is still positive
only for the attacked agent. It is worth mentioning that a dwell
time of 1 s is used for the proposed detection strategy to avoid
chattering of signals and improve the accuracy of detection.
Following the preliminaries of well-defined detection strate-
gies in large power systems [20], it is impossible to detect an
attack if more than half the sensors/actuators are compromised.
To test the effectiveness of the proposed detection strategy for
the highest level of intrusion access index (IA = 3), all the
current sensors and cyber-links are attacked sequentially at t
= {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5} s. Using the risk assessment framework in
Scenario B, it can be concluded that such attacks have the
potential to cause maximum risk without being identified (RA
= 9). It can be seen in Fig. 10 as soon as the attack is initiated
in each agent, corresponding DEI goes positive. However, the
attack conducted at t = 2 and 2.5 s in a wholly attacked system
creates a misconduct for the proposed detection strategy as
only DE1I and DE
3
I go up in the positive region. As a matter
of fact, the proposed strategy doesn’t provide an unified picture
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Fig. 13. Experimental validation of the proposed DE based detection theory with input and output currents: (a) Deception attack (IA = 3) on agent II
and III when agent IV is plugged in-and-out, and (b) Deception attack (IA = 2) on agent II under a maximum communication delay of 65 ms. Positive
DEI for the attacked agents [calculated using (22)] ensures the presence of attack element in the corresponding agents from event A-B.
of the actual event. This depicts its limitation with its operation
bounded to a certain number of compromised cyber-physical
components, which is established when the attack is removed
in Fig. 10. Operating as per the detection criteria during t =
2.5-3.5 s, since DE1I and DE
3
I are in the positive region, the
attack in agent III is removed first. As soon as it is removed,
DEI for the rest of the agents go up into the positive region.
Finally at t = 5 s, when all the attack elements are removed,
the output currents are shared in magnitude similar to the pre-
attack scenario.
Referring to Fig. 11, the reliability of the proposed strategy
is examined when subjected to a maximum communication
delay of 120 ms in the ring-based cyber network. Since delay
affects the performance of the distributed controller, the system
operation is always carried out within a borderline delay such
that the convergence is guaranteed using consensus theory
[18]. Within the said borderline delay range, the rate of con-
vergence is directly proportional to the communication delay.
To test this theory, a deception attack is carried out on agent III
at t = 2 s in Fig. 11. It can be seen that even with a slower rate
of convergence owing to the communication delay, a positive
value for DE3I confirms the presence of attack in agent III.
Hence, it can be concluded that the performance of proposed
detection scheme will remain unaffected by communication
delay as long as the convergence is reached to obey the system
objectives in (6).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed detection strategy has also been experimen-
tally validated in a DC microgrid with N = 4 agents, as
shown in Fig. 12. To demonstrate the inconsiderable ease of
implementation of these attacks and the proposed detection
strategy, the experimental prototype is carried out with four
commercial DC/DC boost converters [21] tied in parallel in
a physical ring-bus network comprising a programmable load
(voltage-dependent mode) in one of the buses. The reference
voltage for each converter, given by (5), can be varied in
their respective control units, as shown in Fig. 12. Each
analog measurement from each converter is communicated
to their neighboring control units using USB accompanying
the Modbus protocol to execute undirected distributed com-
munication. Using the local and neighboring measurements,
the secondary sublayers shown in Fig. 3 is modeled in the
LabVIEW platform to vary the voltage references for each
agent to meet the control objectives in (6) accordingly. To
implement destabilization attacks, the current measurements
are manipulated locally in the respective control unit. On the
other hand, the current signals are manipulated both for the
local and communicated measurements in case of deception
attacks. It is worth notifying that since the commercial DC/DC
converters didn’t have an acquisition channel, the experimental
results have been shown in terms of measurable quantities,
which provides a basic understanding of the proposed dis-
cordant theory. The value of DEI can be calculated using
(22) in the waveforms of input currents with l = 1.2. In the
following results, event A depict the instant where the false
data is injected to initiate the attack and event B depict the
instant where the attack is removed. The experimental testbed
parameters are provided in Appendix.
In Fig. 13(a), the performance of the proposed detection
scheme is evaluated during a converter outage and restoration.
As soon as agent IV is plugged out, the remaining active
agents share the load equally in terms of both input and output
currents. However, when a deception attack of Iadc2 = 0.25 A
and Iadc3 = 0.5 A is injected into agent II and III respectively,
it can be seen that even though output currents are shared
proportionately, the input currents of agents II and III are
in discord with agent I. As already mentioned in Section V,
the communication and control is lost for agent IV, which
restricts the calculation of DEI only for active agents. Further
at event B, when the attack is removed and the agent IV
is restored back at event B, the input and output currents
return back to normal operation by sharing their currents
equally. This demonstrates that the proposed detection scheme
performs normally even under plug in-and-out of agents in DC
microgrids.
In Fig. 13(b), all the current counterparts in agent II,
including output current sensors and cyber link, are injected
with a false data of Iadc = 0.5 A during event A. The system
is operating with a maximum communication delay of 65 ms.
Using Remark II, the control objectives of the system is still
achieved as the output currents from each agent are shared
proportionately. However as per the proposed detection theory,
the input current of agent II goes in discord with the input
currents of remaining agents, which renders a positive value
for DE2I as per (22) between events A to B. Hence, it can
be concluded that the attack detection philosophy performs
normally under experimental conditions even in the presence
of communication delay.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE OF WORK
This paper presents a discordant element based detection
theory to detect two categories of false data injection attacks,
namely destabilization and deception attacks in cyber-physical
DC microgrids. Since such attacks can impose risk on critical
infrastructure, a risk assessment framework is provided to
quantify the impact of each attack in autonomous microgrids.
Furthermore, a theoretical analysis is carried out for cooper-
ative microgrids to analyze the system response based on the
symmetric nature of attack vector into the current sensors and
cyber links. The necessary conditions to model both variants
of attack is studied in detail. Using these discussions, a unified
and fully distributed discordant element based detection theory
is devised to detect the possibility of false data in the network
using extended analysis of consensus theory for the controller
equations. A detailed study is done to differentiate the cyber
attacks from line-to-line faults to avoid false tripping of
relays. Since it operates only using local and neighboring
measurements, this detection strategy can be scaled up to any
number of agents in DC microgrids. It has been simulated for
various test cases of attacks to explain its critical boundaries of
detection under different intrusion access indices. Moreover,
the proposed philosophy is carried out in commercial DC/DC
converters to demonstrate the ease of implementation of the
detection philosophy with minimal effort. This technique can
potentially be a great asset for naval DC microgrids with
security as primary concern. To extend future scope of this
work, theoretical evaluation and validation of sensor failures
and differentiation with cyber attacks will be carried out.
APPENDIX
Simulation Parameters
The considered system consists of four sources rated equally
for 5 kW. It is to be noted that the line parameter Rij is
connected from ith agent to jth agent. Moreover, the controller
gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: R12 = 1.8 Ω, R14 = 1.3 Ω, R23 = 2.3 Ω, R43 = 2.1 Ω
Converter: Lsei= 3 mH, Cdci= 250 µF, imaxdc = 16 A
Controller: Vdcref = 315 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 3, K
H1
I = 0.01,
KH2P = 4.5, K
H2
I = 0.32, GV P = 2.8, GV I = 12.8, GCP =
0.56, GCI = 21.8, Vin = 270 V, g = 2.4, l = 3.24.
Experimental Testbed Parameters
The considered system consists of four sources with the
converters rated equally for 1 kW. It should be noted that the
controller gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: Lsei= 3 mH, Cdci= 100 µF
Controller: Vdcref = 48 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 240.6, K
H1
I =
1.6, KH2P = 4.5, K
H2
I = 0.08, g = 2, l = 1.2, Vin = 36 V.
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